The Jubaland conference supported by Kenya and IGAD finally bore fruit with the adoption of a provisional constitution [PDF] and the selection of (ex-ICU, ex-Kismayo governor, ex-al-Shabaab-aligned leader) Sheikh Ahmed Madobe–who currently leads the Ras Kamboni Brigades. Undoubtedly, his earning of 96 percent of the votes from 500 delegates will raise eyebrows about the politicking behind-the-scenes.

In addition to disputes about clan representation and foreign interference, rivals to Madobe including former Kismayo governor and warlord Barre Hirale declared themselves regional President. Pro-Hirale media sources have issued video of its alternative consultations:

…As well as protests against Madobe in Kismayo:

With a conglomeration of rival troops in and around the city and the rounding up of demonstrations in support of one leader versus another, the chance that tensions could turn increasingly violent are real.

The Legal Context: The Ambiguous Constitution

Ever since the National Constituent Assembly was rushed to approve the provisional constitution in August 2012, vague articles have created opportunities for legal crises regarding the federalism process.

The Somali Federal government (SFG) claims control of the federalism process via Article 48(2) which states:

No single region can stand alone. Until such time as a region merges with another region(s) to form a new Federal Member State, a region shall be directly administered by the Federal Government for a maximum period of two years.

The SFG used this right to appoint a governor to the Gedo region–even as the Jubaland administration seeks to unify Gedo and Lower and Middle Juba.

Similar temporary administrations have been assigned in Bay and Hiiraan regions–which may have contributed to Ethiopia’s increasing anxiety about its role in the region. More generally, SFG rivals have labelled these temporary administrations as efforts to undermine Jubaland and other potential state formation processes.

President Hassan has more domestic priorities than most sitting heads of state. But the slow pace of carrying out a cohesive vision on decentralization has further emboldened political players outside Mogadishu to start the process themselves.

Pro-Jubalanders and other advocates for decentralization have clung to Article 49(6) to justify their efforts. The article states:

Based on a voluntary decision, two or more regions may merge to form a Federal Member State.

However, there are legal aspects of this process that fall directly on the shoulders of the Federal Parliament. Article 49(1-5) task the body with (1) nominating a commission with defined powers to study and make recommendations on the federalism issue and (2) determining the number and boundaries of Federal Member States.

Importantly, the Federal Parliament has not moved on any of these duties and has failed to pass any significant motions other its budget since taking office. Its failure to fulfill its own mandate has been one of the drivers of instability within the federalism process.

Despite this institutional inefficacy, one renegade clic within the parliament has found it un-ironic to target Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon with a no-confidence motion due to “frustration with the pace of political reform.”

Overall, competing articles and duties have created a legal quagmire: how can two or more states merge voluntarily if the Federal Parliament is responsible for determining the number and boundaries of Federal Member States–all while the SFG retains the right to appoint “obstructive” temporary administrations?

Thus, there remain serious legal gaps in reconciling the various rights, responsibilities, and processes necessary to carry out the federalism process.

Realpolitik

As a result of legal gaps, the SFG’s hesitations, and the Parliament’s inactions, the influence of Kenya, Ethiopia, and IGAD features even more prominently on the federalism stage.

At the moment, Kenya enjoys a productive alliance with Madobe and his Ras Kamboni militia, and Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) spokesman Cyrus Oguna has not been shy about his support for Jubaland.

IGAD, too, has openly supported the Jubaland conference.  (Note: President Hassan publicly supported it as early as November 2012 before backing out after claiming the process was unfair to certain clans and was subject to undue foreign interference.)

Despite lack of SFG support, both Kenya and IGAD continued to support the Jubaland process.

Though the details are murky, some analysts speculate that Hirale is the spoiler in Kismayo on behalf of either Ethiopia (who views Madobe as supportive of ONLF Ethiopian rebels) or the SFG. For years Hirale has used support from Ethiopia to accomplish his agenda, and before his arrival in Kismayo it was alleged that he was in Mogadishu.

IGAD officials meet with pro-Madobe elders and reps

Now that Hirale and other self-proclaimed presidents have came to the fore, IGAD has tried to perform a more neutral role by meeting with clan elders from multiple sides. But due to IGAD’s clear role in the process that led to the selection of Madobe, it is questionable whether the body can serve as a neutral mediating force.

PM Shirdon has appointed a 16-member task force to address the crisis in Jubaland. However, the SFG must make more transparent diplomatic efforts that are perceived as genuine toward parties in Jubaland in order to remove itself from the sidelines of efforts to reconcile the tense situation in Kismayo.

Toward this end, the President Hassan could adjust his public rhetoric of Jubaland toward one that proposes a specific process for resolution on outstanding issues.

Future of Federalism

The predicament in Jubaland sets a negative precedent on the potential outcomes of merging states in the future.

The lack of a consensus regarding (1) which parties have specific rights in the state formation process and (2) which states will agree to merge as a whole provides the perfect ingredients for proclamations of multiple administrations by rivaling interests.

The regional governance picture in the rest of the country is already complicated.

Galgaduud and Mudug regions are home to administrations such as Galmudug (which shares Galkayo with Puntland under a tense relationship) and Ximan and Xeeb.  These administrations are constructed outside of the bounds of the current constitution by not merging two or more regions.  There is significant risk for conflict regarding how to reconcile these administrations within a constitutionally acceptable structure.

If the influence of Kenya in Jubaland is any indicator of how border countries will influence the federalism process, one can expect Ethiopia to seek a similar role in influencing administrations formed along the long border it holds with Bakool, Hiiraan, Galgaduud, and Mudug regions where it has long established relationships with several clan militias and political leaders.

The disparate visions and interests of local and foreign players could mean that parties unsatisfied with one process could create their own.

It is also discussed perhaps insufficiently that with large portions of the country outside major cities still in control of al-Shabaab, the prospect of forming Federal Member States that can control the space in its mandate and can form with the appropriate popular support remains a critical issue. For example, Jubaland’s political capital is in Buale (Middle Juba), which like other areas in Jubaland is in firm al-Shabaab control.

Moving Forward

The federalism project was heralded with optimism and caution at the beginning of President Hassan’s tenure. But at the moment it is  functioning as an open season for political opportunism and regional factionalization by some parties inside and outside of Somalia.

President Hassan used the platform of the inauguration of a children’s education center (pictured right) in Mogadishu to ask Somaliland to “swallow [its] ambition for independent nationhood.”

In addition to potentially dampering some of the feel-good sentiments coming out of recent talks with Somaliland in Turkey, President Hassan’s comment comes amid the potential for greater division in South Central Somalia.

If the SFG fails to negotiate a consensus on the Jubaland issue and fails to head off  similar future crises, it risks further isolating itself even as it tries to show the international community that it is in charge of domestic affairs outside Mogadishu.

Furthermore, a precedent similar to Puntland could continue in which regional states are governed with minimal coordination with Mogadishu due to ongoing antagonism toward the central government.

President Hassan’s goal to unify and stabilize Somalia must be supported with a vision reached by consensus, but there has been little effort to start a process to develop such a collective vision.

When so many issues inside Somalia require a military or financial solution, dialogue is one that is scarcely found, invaluable, and most importantly: free of charge.

For a background of the conflict between Hammami, foreign fighters, and other al-Shabaab factions, see here and here.

The initial Bar Kulan report alleged that senior leader Fuad Shongole gave a sermon in Buulo Burde town mosque in which he described killing of Hammami during an ambush on him and his allied fighters in Rama Cadeey village in Somalia’s Bay region.

However, no other credible news agencies independently verified the report, and observers of the saga doubt the veracity of the claim due to the nature of Bar Kulan as the sole source.

News site Dayniile–which initially piggy-backed on the Bar Kulan report (and is not always reliable)–already has backtracked from claims of Hammami’s death.

An updated article from Dayniile claims to be quoting un-named al-Shabaab officials (again it is not known who is propagating the info) who state that Hammami is “still alive.” It also quotes an alleged attendee of Shongole’s lecture who claims that Shongole actually said that al-Shabaab killed a foreign fighter named “Sharif,” i.e., not “Omar” or “Abu Mansur.” Since the lecture does not appear to have been recorded, these details are difficult to confirm unless other witnesses come forward.

Importantly, no prominent pro-Shabaab sites have carried news about Hammami’s death; no influential al-Shabaab leaders–or even Hammami through his likely twitter account– have issued an update on the situation. In absence of info from these sources, rumors of Hammami’s death are once again based on unconfirmed and circular reporting, and there has been at least one retraction.

Lastly, a credible Mogadishu-based freelance journalist with a history of successfully confirming similar details says that he spoke with sources close to Shongole who said that the leader did not address the issue at all in his recent sermon.

All these factors make the claim that Hammami is dead similar to past false accusations.

Public Relations Factor

These types of rumors could fuel (and could have been launched in order to exacerbate) public bickering between al-Shabaab factions, as well as discourage Somalia from being the country of choice for would-be jihadis.

In the past, al-Shabaab has wavered between outright ignoring public discussion of internal problems and issuing delayed statements in the aftermath of public rants by dissidents like Hammami.

The continued spread of this rumor–regardless of how false it may currently be–is not an issue that al-Shabaab would like to be stuck addressing publicly because it is a distraction from the group framing itself as united, strong, welcoming to foreign fighters, and a credible alternative to the Somali government.

It is also important to note that al-Shabaab’s various public relations outlets like to take their time in responding to these kinds of issues in order not be appear rattled, weak, or indecisive. Therefore, it is difficult to tell when an official response (or a verified response from an influential leader) will be released.

Somalia’s first permanent government in 22 years faces significant obstacles in getting the nation’s economy back on track.

However, in comparison to the corruption rife in previous administrations, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s government has so far garnered positive reviews inside and outside the country, and expectations are high that his administration is in a position to jumpstart the economy.

Hundreds of camels wait at the port of Mogadishu on March 8th for export to Saudi Arabia. [Mohamed Abdiwahab/AFP

If the government pursues innovative solutions in the telecommunications, agriculture and fishing industries, and reduces risks associated with tapping the country’s natural resources, Somalia’s economy could see a well-needed lift that would also be a boost for peace and development.

Continue reading here.

Large contingents of Somali soldiers have been training in Uganda, Djibouti, and  Somalia by multiple partners—including the United States, the EU, and AMISOM. Training has been successful overall but at times hampered by a lack of equipment, including guns and combat gear, as pictured on the left.

The addition of 1,000 trained counter-terrorism forces, which have been equipped with the necessary arms and vehicles—could change the landscape of the security environment in Mogadishu.

Since the budget for these forces and their operations has not been allocated by the Ministry of Defence, it is unclear what the cost will be or if there are sufficient funds to support them. This is an ongoing problem for Somali security forces that could impact the new unit.

Security Strategy

To complement newly trained and armed forces, the SFG will also need to continue to develop a successful security and intelligence strategy.

After the UK warned on 5 April 2013 of an imminent attack by al-Shabaab , many scolded the Somali government for not taking adequate preparation to protect likely targets like the Supreme Court. Though it is not known what details about the attack were shared between the UK and the Somali government, the gaps in preparation reflect the need to beef up protocols when such warnings are issued.

In terms of improving intelligence, a new ‘888’ tip line for local residents to provide info to police  may help to prevent violent attacks. It  is also a good step away from the government’s strategy of mass arrests (often of hundreds)—which appear to be arbitrary and at some times extortionary.

Importance of Relationships with Communities

On the same day of al-Shabaab’s coordinated attacks in Mogadishu, it was reported that civilians helped Somali and AMISOM forces identify an IED in Mogadishu’s Hodan District that was safely detonated.  This event highlights the importance building productive relationships with local communities to combat al-Shabaab—something that could be harmed by carrying out mass arrests or the alleged execution of young al-Shabaab suspects in custody.

Relatedly, al-Shabaab’s spokesperson Ali Mohamud Rage said that the reason why the group attacked the Supreme Court was that it was a symbol of the government’s unfair and non-Islamic judicial system.  However, the victims in al-Shabaab’s attack were mostly not associated with the government—including lawyers and activists who successfully fought against injustice.

American Jihadi Omar Hammami (Abu Mansur al-Amriki) criticized the attack

The Somali government can help to further delegitimize al-Shabaab’s statements by making security officials more accountable for for their actions.

This could mean further scrutiny of Somali security officials accused of unethical or criminal behavior—including the commander of the Criminal Investigation Deparment (CID) Abdullahi Hasan Barise (involving alleged bribes for release) and the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) chief for the Banadir region Colonel Khalif Ahmed Ereg (involving the aforementioned youth killings).

Counter-terrorism Law

The new anti-terrorism law passed by the Somali parliament gives security forces the right to detain terrors suspects for 48 hours or less without  charge.

While suspects have been detained for longer than two days without charge in the past, the new law will add another controversial legal layer to counter-terrorism efforts that mirrors dilemmas in the U.S. and other countries regarding detention policy.

The new law also makes it a crime for remittance and telecom companies to send payments or provide services to al-Shabaab members.

It is no secret that al-Shabaab charges all organizations and companies hefty fees (zakat and other taxes) for operating in its areas—though many groups have been kicked out in recent years for various reasons.

The Somali government appears to be reacting to new reports showing that Dahabshiil—Somalia’s most widely used remittance company—provided cash payments to top al-Shabaab leaders.

The company briefly fell out with al-Shabaab in early April 2013—leading to a closure of its offices in some areas and an explosion targeting the Dahabshiil main office in Mogadishu. However, the company reportedly reached an agreement with al-Shabaab to resume services.  Given the importance of Dahabshiil in the $1.6 billion per year remittance industry, it will be interesting to see how the government utilizes its new legal leverage with Dahabshiil without attracting the ire of those who depend on these types of companies for routine services.

Moving Forward

Overall, the recent actions by the Somali government show steps to strengthen the number of trained forces and legal frameworks available to counter al-Shabaab more effectively.

If these tools are complemented by an improved security strategy, military re-structuring and professionalization, adequate financial support, and better leadership within the security and intelligence agencies, the Somali government could continue significant gains in addressing the dynamics of violence in Mogadishu.

As many as 34 people were killed and almost 60 injured in a set of coordinated attacks by al-Shabaab in Mogadishu involving suicide bombers, gunmen, and two separate car bomb attacks.

A car bomb was detonated at the entrance of the Supreme Court complex in Mogadishu around 12:30 PM on Sunday.

Several attackers wearing suicide belts and other al-Shabaab gunmen entered the building, took hostages, and sprayed the building with gunfire as others hid within the building’s maze of rooms.

One of the presumed targets of the attack–Supreme Court Chief Justice Aidid Ilka Hanaf–was reportedly unharmed and survived according to reports.

Civilian Deaths

Among the dead were dozens of civilians, including journalist Mohamed Hassan Habeeb, lawyers Abdikarin Hassan Gorod and Mohamed Mohamud Afrah, and other young professionals.

Habeeb, the fourth Somali journalist killed this year, was a media advisor in the courts system.

Gorod (pictured left) and Afrah were the lawyers who earned the release of journalist Abdiaziz Koronto in March 2013.

Koronto was controversially imprisoned earlier this year over the interview of an alleged rape victim.

The battle inside and outside of the courtroom lasted about two hours before fortunate survivors were able to trickle out of the building.

Turkish Victims

In a later incident around 3 PM, a car bomb was detonated on the road to Mogadishu’s international airport as a convoy of AMISOM and Turkish Red Crescent workers were en route.

There were conflicting reports on whether the Turkish workers were killed or not, but the Somali driver of the Turkish convoy was said to have died in the explosion along with woman a child nearby.

Al-Shabaab Praises Attacks

Al-Shabaab’s twitter account praised the attacks as another blow to the “apostate” regime and as another indication that “there is no safe haven for apostates in Mogadishu.”

However, this set of attacks was yet another symbol of how al-Shabaab’s operations continue to kill civilians who are not affiliated–or even necessarily support–the government.

Koronto and his team speak with the media after his release

The death of Koronto’s lawyers and other young professionals who were killed in the attacks fought government injustices (successfully) without murdering their compatriots.

Mogadishu residents already have legitimate grievances due to harassment, sexual violence, and illegal taxation carried out by criminal elements within Somali security forces.

But, currently al-Shabaab’s indiscriminate attacks at Lido beach and other parts of the city show that the group has no corrective vision for capital residents who are ready to rebuild, not re-arm.

In mid-March 2013, Ethiopian troops deployed in the strategic town of Xudur in Bakool region withdrew its forces with little warning to residents or allied forces.

Somali National Army (SNA) troops, who left alongside the Ethiopians, could not hold the town from al-Shabaab without external support partly due to insufficient weapons and ammunition.

At least 2,500 civilians fled to areas near the town of Ceel Barde 90km north as a result.

Unsurprisingly, al-Shabaab immediately swooped in and reclaimed Xudur after surrendering it in February 2012.

The withdrawal gave a strategic and moral victory to al-Shabaab militants under the command of Mukhtar Robow (aka Abu Mansur)—presumably hurting Ethiopia’s efforts to create a “buffer zone” on Somalia’s western borders.

Mukhtar Robow

After laying low in recent months, Robow resurfaced to stamp his authority on the town and to intimidate local residents from further cooperating with anyone else but al-Shabaab.

This was done, shockingly, by beheading a well-respected elderly religious figure who also worked with the government as a local judge.

Al-Shabaab claimed that Ethiopia was fatigued by the group’s strategy of internal attacks, ambushes, and blockades on the Ethiopian’s supply lines.

But there are several other ways to look at Ethiopia’s current posture in Somalia—especially in light of its failed attempt to oust the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) from 2006-2009.

Ethiopia’s Increasingly Contested Influence by Mogadishu

Since President Mohamud took office in September 2012, his administration slowly has been trying to replace regional administrators. Several of these leaders are closely tied to or supported by Ethiopia, and the changes have been contested publicly and privately.

In February 2013, Mogadishu controversially replaced Bay governor Abdifatah Ibrahim Geesey with Abdi Adan Hooshow, and fighting broke out between troops loyal to both militias. Ethiopian troops reportedly acted on behalf of Geesey, who was on very good terms with Ethiopia.

In Hiiraan region, Ethiopia has strongly resisted Mogadishu’s attempt to replace governor Abdifatah Hasan Afrah, originally appointed by ex-President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed in March 2012.

Afrah is leader of the Shabelle Valley Administration (SVA)—one of the key militia groups that helped to liberate Beledweyne (capital of Hiiraan) from al-Shabaab in late 2011 with the help from Somali government and Ahlu-Sunna Wal-Jama’a (ASWJ) troops.

To date, the SVA and ASWJ have received significant support from Ethiopia.

Lastly, there are increasing signs that Mogadishu is trying to incentivize ASWJ to cut its ties with Ethiopia by signing a security agreement and encouraging its forces to enter under the command of the SNA.

Though the Somali government’s courtship of ASWJ is not new (and has failed before), the ongoing efforts to remove Ethiopian influence from the group is one of many examples of competition between the historical rivals.

The effort to introduce new leaders in Somalia’s western regions with less ties to Ethiopia is a strategic blow to the latter’s influence in the country but easily could exacerbate bilateral tensions.

Given these dynamics, discussions must have been intense in a meeting between Somali Speaker of Parliament Osman Jawaari and Ethiopian officials in the February 2013 visit to Addis Ababa. Talks were intended to discuss “parliamentary cooperation” but likely involved security discussions as well.

Ethiopia’s Evolving Somalia Policy

While most other countries in Somalia operate under the 17,731 troops within AMISOM contingents, Ethiopia has bucked the trend.

By not joining AMISOM, Ethiopia has been free to independently pursue its interests, plans, and goals in Somalia.

However, given Ethiopia’s contested local influence—and equally important—the death of its enigmatic and controversial leader Meles Zenawi announced in August 2012, it is unclear what direction its foreign policy will take.

Historically, the Ethiopian government has seen Somalia mostly as a source of extremism that must be contained and as a general threat due to the “Greater Somalia” movement. Ethiopia’s strategy has worked toward a Somalia that is not too weak and not too strong.

Few believe that Zenawi’s successor—former Deputy Prime Minister and current PM Hailemariam Desalegn—is as influential as his new role implies.

Rather, top political and military officials within the ruling TPLF are expected to be jockeying for power behind the scenes while managing the strategic direction of Ethiopia.

It is less clear how this power struggle is affecting Ethiopia’s actions in Somalia, but it is something to watch in the short-term.

To be clear, Ethiopia has stated on repeated occasions in the past year that it desired AMISOM troops to take its place in Somalia. Thus, the nature of Ethiopia’s withdrawal from Xudur is more surprising than its intention to do so.

Moving Forward

During the buildup to Ethiopia’s last major pullout of Somali in late 2008, it made very public efforts to ensure “AMISOM is not put in danger” during the withdrawal.

While the Ethiopians’ uncoordinated exit of Hudur didn’t directly hurt AMISOM troops, it most certainly negatively affected thousands of civilians who had little time to flee or to prepare to endure al-Shabaab’s return.

Whether AMISOM can now maintain the territory taken from al-Shabaab with its current level of troops is an open question. AMISOM’s spokesperson guaranteed to RFI journalist Daniel Finnan that is has the requisite capacity to do so.

As for Ethiopia, a diminishing ability to influence events in Somalia through local allies could mean that will rely more on AMISOM to keep al-Shabaab at bay while it focuses more on countering potential threats inside its own borders.

A delegation has been sent by the Somali Ministry of Interior to address the continued infighting between government-allied militias in the port town of Marka—located 110 km south of the capital Mogadishu.

Since 22 March 2013, shootouts have occurred several times between rival government militias, causing tension among residents.

The delegation’s job is to consult with members of conflicting sides and sort out reasons behind the fighting.

Why the Infighting?

Pro-al-Shabaab sites reported that in one incident 10 people died and as many were injured after rival government militias exchanged fire over disagreements on how to divide the profits from an illegal checkpoint set up in the town.

Other sites pointed to larger conflicts between political administrators and armed groups affiliated with them.

The local commissioner in Marka—Ahmed Maalim Ukash—recently talked about the relationship with his deputy, stating, “We are not getting along too well. Last night gangs attacked my house and am sure he was the mastermind behind those planned attacks…My deputy wants to murder me.”

In a slightly different view, the governor of Lower Shabelle region—Abdikadir Mohamed—said the problem had to do with inter-clan fighting within clan-based militias that make much of the Somali National Army (SNA). Abdikadir stated, “This [clan militia] problem has grown…[The] problem has really increased tensions in the city.”

Though there are various reasons to explain infighting between SNA militias in Marka, they are not mutually exclusive or unheard of in other towns.

New Weapons Shipments

While government militia infighting continues to be a problem, Somalia is due to receive its first shipment of weapons since parts of the arms embargo were controversially lifted by the UN Security Council. (See concerns about the decision here.)

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud responded to the announcement, stating, “We are not worried about getting [arms] supplies, we’re concerned about the management of these supplies.”

Mohamud’s concern is a relevant one. On 11 March 2013, reports emerged about a cache of weapons that was stolen from the Villa Somalia presidential grounds by unknown culprits, meaning that weapons are still insecure in what should be the most secure location in the country.

Unless reforms are made to address problems such as infighting and securing weapons, an influx of arms could contribute to insecurity in towns liberated from al-Shabaab. (For example, imagine the same infighting in Marka but with more arms between militias.)

It is also relevant to ask which groups within the Somali security forces will receive weapons from the first shipment due to reach Mogadishu in the next two months.

If the weapons go to certain forces in Mogadishu, as many would expect, it could cause an uproar among President Mohamud’s critics (especially those far outside the capital) and rival militias.

In other words, the distribution of weapons is a political act as much as it is one of security.

Long-Term Security Reform

In order to improve the effectiveness of Somali security forces in the short-term, Mohamud’s administration should prioritize resolving key issues between rival militias that are the causes of infighting—whether they are caused by lack of pay or inter-clan feuds.

Retiring aging military chiefs and getting rid of incompetent security officials is a good start to security reform.

But in the long-term, one of the hardest tasks will be infusing the solidarity, patriotism, and professionalism among Somali soldiers and police that so many Somalis desire.

The big question will be what programs and policies can be created to reach these goals. Perhaps Somalia’s newest think tank Heritage Institute for Policy Studies (HIPS) can be a leader in proposing new and innovative ideas.

If these risks are not addressed, it is possible that Somalia’s ongoing federalization process could further promote the growth of regional militias with little allegiance to a unified Somalia–an outcome few want to happen and one that could undermine strides in the country’s progress.

On 7 March 3013, a grenade was thrown at the al-Rawda mosque in Bosaso during an al-I’tisam lecture ironically entitled “Infringements on Islam and the Resulting Problems.” No group has taken responsibility for the attack, but many suspect it was al-Shabaab.

Footage of the event and the explosion can be seen in the video below at the 1:50 mark.

Deaths of Al-I’tisam Clerics

Al-Shabaab has been blamed for the deaths of two prominent al-I’tisam clerics: Sheikh Ahmed Haji Abdirahman in December 2011 and more recently Sheikh Abdulkadir Nur Farah in February 2013.

Top al-Shabaab leaders have yet to comment on the murder of Sheikh Abdulkadir. Comments by the group’s sidelined religious figure Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys (who was a senior leader in AIAI) were not completely convincing in absolving al-Shabaab.

Another marginalized leader—Sheikh Mukhtar Robow—also denied the killing.  But, this hardly will change the belief among many that al-Shabaab members were involved.

As a result of Sheikh Abdulkadir’s murder, al-I’tisam has promised to step up efforts to counter al-Shabaab’s influence and proposed the idea of an anti-al-Shabaab conference.

A few of the thousands who attended Sheikh Abdulkadir’s funeral in Garowe

From Fatwa War To Real War

In the past, religious figures supportive of each group have issued fatwas (religious edicts) criticizing the authority of the other group.

As al-Shabaab continues its effort to increase its operations and recruitment in Puntland, al-I’tisam leaders could be the continued targets of attacks.

Even though the two groups share basic Salafi principles—such as advocating for an Islamic state in Somalia—al-Shabaab sees al-I’tisam as a stumbling block for the spread of an armed resistance against foreign forces and “apostates” in Somalia.

Though there have been exceptions in the past, al-I’tisam has pursued its goals in recent years non-violently through religious education.

Contrastingly, it appears al-Shabaab will rely on the same strategies in Puntland that it has used in southern Somalia to garner support: [1] provide benefits to and gain the loyalty from clans marginalized by the government and [2] more broadly exploit anti-government sentiments.

Mohamed Ali Yusuf

For example, pro-al-Shabaab site Somali Memo recently claimed in February 2013 that al-Shabaab had succeeded in recruiting the support of Warsengeli clan elder Mohamed Ali Yusuf—who weeks earlier had critiqued an array of Puntland politicians.

Additionally, anti-Farole protests are becoming more common than President Farole would like, partially due to the circumstances in which he extended his term for one more year and other controversial measures such as banning the import of fuel from Yemen.

These circumstances present Puntland with significant religious, political, and security challenges in the near future—even as it signs a historic agreement for cooperation with Mogadishu.

Somali hero Elman Ali Ahmed‘s motto was QORI DHIG QALIN QAADO (Put Down the Gun, Pick Up the Pen) via http://vintagesomalia.tumblr.com/

Lifting the arms embargo is seen by some observers as a means to address the force capacity of Somali security forces and to reassert Somalia’s sovereignty. However, the internal and strategic factors limiting the effectiveness of Somali security forces and the economic impact of lifting the embargo in the war economy should not be ignored.

The United Nations (UN) imposed an arms embargo against Somalia in 1992 in an effort to reduce the flow of arms to warlords during the beginning of the civil war.

Previous governments called for the ban to be lifted, and Somalia’s new administration has continued a similar campaign.

The Somali government wants the arms embargo lifted so that it can acquire the tools necessary to hold territory and consolidate gains made against al-Shabaab without dependence on AMISOM’s tanks and firepower.

It also seeks the rights of a sovereign government that does not appear under the thumb of the international community.

Security Reforms Before Lifting the Arms Embargo

Though the Somali government lists legitimate justifications, there are several fundamental issues directly related to lifting the embargo that need to be addressed in Somalia’s security sector in order to make the removal of the embargo effective and to limit potential negative consequences of more arms flooding into Somalia:

Making the Somali National Army “national” in more than name. Somali security forces still remain a force made up of clan, warlord, and paramilitary factions rather than a unified force. If these forces are not properly integrated into a cohesive body, President Mohamud’s administration could be seen (as they are by pro-Puntland observers) as using the removal of the arms embargo to “arm to his [Hawiye-Abgaal] clansmen in Mogadishu” or to arm other proxy forces.

More seriously, the divided nature of pro-government security forces could be the grounds from which an  arms race begins by clans or other armed groups to be used in defense or offense against other rival militias.

Resolving basic security issues.  The Somali security forces’ insufficiency of arms is not the only factor that has allowed al-Shabaab to be a continued menace or for general insecurity matters to persist. The strategy and efficacy of the security apparatus to stop guerrilla attacks and to police successfully are equally important.

For example, more arms would not have prevented an alleged al-Shabaab defector from gaining entrance into the heavily protected Villa Somalia government compound and detonating himself in the vicinity of Prime Minister Abdifarah Shirdon.

Additionally, the frequent occurrence of mass arrests of al-Shabaab ‘suspects’ or shootouts between government forces warrants a revision of the overall security strategy and the discipline of soldiers and police.  The effort to lift the embargo should not overlook these basic security concerns.

Paying Somali security forces consistently. Somali soldiers have long been known to sell their arms provided to them in order to make up for wages not paid to them for months at a time. Therefore, an influx of new arms to government security forces may eventually be funneled to weapons dealers–or even al-Shabaab–if inconsistent pay and other incentives to sell government weapons are not removed.

Assessing ways to safely transport and track large shipments of arms. Moving large shipments of arms/vehicles/equipment  throughout Somalia could be difficult since al-Shabaab still controls many roads between major cities; ambushes remain frequent. It is highly likely that al-Shabaab would use its control of (or presence near) main transport routes to hijack these lorries and reinforce its own military caches.  This type of threat makes it difficult to transport large volumes of military equipment and calls for a system to track these assets as they enter and move about the country.

Beefing up port security. Al-Shabaab has been exploiting weak port security along the Somaliland/Puntland coast to receive weapons from abroad. It also still controls the port of Baraawe–located halfway between Kismayo and Mogadishu.

If  arms shipments along the coast increase in a post-embargo scenario, al-Shabaab will look to expand any means it can to receive more weapons from its allies outside the country.

Clarifying legal rules regarding who can import arms and contract military training.  In recent years, Puntland has disregarded the arms embargo by receiving military training and arms from private military firm SARACEN in order to fortify its regional security force, which is battling an increasing number of al-Shabaab forces in the region.  Another anti-al-Shabaab militia–ASWJ–has received similar support from private military firm Southern Ace and Ethiopia.

Following these leads, other regional states may seek to arm their security forces apart from any assistance it may receive from the federal government. Here again, the clan-based composition and loyalty of local, regional, and national security forces is relevant. As mentioned earlier, there is a risk that an arms build-up between clan-based security forces could trigger new waves of armed clan conflict that are unrelated–and will in fact undermine efforts to fight–al-Shabaab. 

The Somali federal government is already engaged in a complex and potentially de-stabilizing battle with the country’s regions over how to implement federalism and power-sharing under vague details in the constitution. The debate about who can buy arms will be an added dimension to this.

Consequences In The War Economy

Another important consequence of lifting the arms embargo that should be considered would be the effect in domestic arms markets. A recent report explained how the price of AK-47s and bullets had shot up in recent years due to policies meant to curb the availability and sale of arms and ammunition.

The number of arms that would eventually flood the arms market in Somalia after lifting the arms embargo would work against the Somalia government’s efforts to keep arms out of the hands of civilians,  weapons merchants,  al-Shabaab, and other militias.

It also would make the price of these goods tumble over time. This price decrease would make arms imports even cheaper. So, while government forces would have more arms to fight al-Shabaab, the insurgents themselves would benefit from the implications in the war economy.

Big Picture

Lifting the arms embargo is a measure that seeks to address the force capacity of Somali security forces, but it does not address the internal and strategic factors limiting its effectiveness. Additionally, the economic impact on the availability and price of arms cannot be ignored.  Therefore, the effort to lift the arms embargo should not overshadow the importance of other issues in Somalia’s security sector.

The attack killed the bomber, two other people, and wounded several others. PM Shirdon was in his home at the time of the bombing but was not harmed.

The suicide bombing damaged a small room where the PM’s security guards are stationed

According to AP reporter Abdi Guled, the bomber was four checkpoints away from the home of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who was out of the country to attend meetings in Europe.

National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) chief for Banadir region Colonel Khalif Ahmed Ereg identified the attacker as Ali Abdi Hared Malin and released his picture.

Reuters, citing security guards at the scene, reported that Malin was able to enter Villa Somalia with an identity card used by security forces and “frequently visited [Villa Somalia.]” This fueled speculation that Malin was a part of the security apparatus.

Suicide bomber and al-Shabaab “defector” Ali Abdi Hared Malin

However, Ereg discounted the rumors that Malin was a member of intelligence or security forces and claimed that Malin defected from al-Shabaab only two weeks before the attack on 14 January 2013 in the town of Wanlaweyn (90 km north of Mogadishu). Malin allegedly was being investigated in a local defectors camp before he later escaped.

Ereg stated that he would be look into how the attacker was facilitated out of the camp in order to carry out the attack.

The bombing shows the acute risk that Somali officials still face from al-Shabaab, which claimed responsibility for the failed operation.

Danger from “Defectors”

Though Malin was not employed by the government, his ability to escape from a defectors camp and penetrate one of the most heavily-guarded zones in Mogadishu draws into question the government’s policies and programs regarding defectors.

The Somali government has come under heavy criticism for absorbing ex-Shabaab members into sensitive intelligence and security positions.

It may believe that this strategy can help it to catch al-Shabaab members and foil potential attacks. But the fact that the government has continued mass arrest campaigns to find al-Shabaab “members” (as opposed to pinpointed apprehensions) and the steady string of attacks in the capital show that using defectors may not be an effective strategy.

Equally important, al-Shabaab has used defectors to infiltrate Somali government circles for some time, which makes it even harder to justify the employment of defectors in security or intelligence capacities.

The Somali government has taken some steps to guard against internal enemies.  In addition to the establishment of defector camps and rehab programs, there have been workshops in the past to discuss standard operation procedures for how to integrate former fighters into society.

Paul D. Williams, an Associate Professor at George Washington University, recently published an insightful report calling for greater financial funding, resources, and planning regarding how to disengage the 250 defectors held by AMISOM and 1,500 held by the Somali government. The report also contains many other important details about the issue of defectors and rehab efforts in Somalia.

Another real worry–largely based in rumor–is that the Villa Somalia bombing was not simply the work of an al-Shabaab “defector,” but part of a more intricate plan involving at least one un-named senior NISA official. If this is the case, securing Villa Somalia (and the greater Mogadishu area) has as much to do with identifying nefarious elements in the government as it does with establishing programs for defectors.

Stability at Risk

Al-Shabaab doesn’t control Mogadishu, but the Villa Somalia bombing shows the group has the presence, will, and capacity to attempt more assassinations in the future on officials at the highest level of government.

While this wouldn’t magically bring back al-Shabaab to its former strength or make it more popular locally, it would accomplish the group’s goal of sowing the seeds of instability in a brand new government that still relies heavily on international forces for protection.