Analysis: Somali Government Executes Pressure Campaign against Jubaland
December 6, 2024 4:52 pm
Amid an ongoing dispute over the format of local and national elections, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) is executing a high pressure campaign against Jubaland region through lawfare, territorial pressure, and political pressure.
Background: FGS and allied regions (Hirshabelle, Galmudug, Southwest) agreed on a controversial plan to extend the terms of several regional leaders in support of holding one person-one vote (OPOV) local and regional elections in June and September 2025, respectively. The results notionally would set the stage for OPOV national elections in 2026. Jubaland, Puntland, and other opposition leaders do not believe the country is in a position to hold OPOV elections on that timeline and accuse the FGS of simply seeking an excuse to extend its term.
So far, the pressure campaign has looked like this:
Lawfare: FGS and Jubaland have issued dueling legal orders during the pressure campaign. Leading to recent actions, the FGS refused to recognize Madobe’s fourth electoral victory in November as regional president (after previous victories in 2013, 2015, 2019.). Jubaland, along with its ally Puntland, has “suspended cooperation” with the FGS due to the electoral dispute (although this did not stop FGS and Jubaland from appearing together at a recent ATMIS base handover ceremony.)
Banadir court issued an arrest warrant for Madobe, while a Jubaland court took the same measure against Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.
The FGS requested a Red Notice with INTERPOL, likely intended to deter Madobe’s travel abroad to seek foreign support.
Madobe shut down communications in Raas Kambooni (which would also impact his own forces’ command and control) and instructed aviation officials to block flights coming into the local airport. This has not stopped FGS’s influx of troops via air transport to date.
On December 6, airlines suspended domestic flights after there were credible threats of Jubaland forces firing on FGS flights into Ras Kamboni. By December 7, the FGS reportedly convinced airlines to re-start flights that would ferry troops to the southern city.
Territorial and Political Pressure: FGS seeks to reduce Madobe’s influence in Jubaland in order to delegitimize his claim to power and possibly bring him back to the negotiation table. Realistically, Madobe has little influence outside of Kismayo because there is strong opposition to him in Gedo, where FGS is seeking to build support. In addition, al-Shabaab control the entirety of Middle Jubba region.
FGS has deployed troops to El Waaq in Gedo region, where opposition to Madobe is strong, and to Raas Kambooni.
FGS also has given support to Gedo governor Abdullahi Jama Shimbir, who has managed to return to the Gego region capital of Garbahaarey after Madobe fired him over corruption allegations and his endorsement of the FGS election agreement.
Jubaland has diverted troops from Buulo Xaaji, Kismayo, and Jana Abdalle to Kudha, probably to limit FGS troops’ vicinity to Kismayo.
Outlook
Security Transition Brings More Infighting: There is a high likelihood that competition between armed Somali factions (as well as al-Shabaab) will increase as the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) transitions to a smaller footprint under African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).
FGS Heading Toward a Pyrric Victory: Even if the FGS is successful at expanding its influence in Jubaland, its warfare-driven approach will not have created the grounds for a political consensus, particularly with influential Kismayo clans, over how to implement OPOV elections. If the FGS goal is to create a scenario in which it seeks an extension at the end of President Hassan Sheikh’s term in 2026, which opposition believe is the case, then it would be the most cynical version of success possible.
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